I was recently asked to speak to the media about WannaCry. While preparing for the interview (see the video below), I’ve realized that this particular case is a good illustration of the various dimensions of cybersecurity: Continue reading
Category Archives: human factos in security
Current smartphone operating systems regulate application permissions by prompting users on an ask-on-first-use basis. Prior research has shown that this method is ineffective because it fails to account for context: the circumstances under which an application first requests access to data may be vastly different than the circumstances under which it subsequently requests access. LERSSE’s Primal is leading the research collaboration with UC Berkeley, in which a longitudinal 131-person field study was performed to analyze the contextuality behind user privacy decisions to regulate access to sensitive resources. Continue reading
This paper reports on why people use, not use, or have stopped using mobile tap-and-pay in stores. The results of our online survey with 349 Apple Pay and 511 Android Pay participants suggest that the top reason for using mobile tap-andpay is usability. Surprisingly, for nonusers of Apple Pay, security was their biggest concern. A common security misconception we found among the nonusers (who stated security as their biggest concern) was that they felt storing card information on their phones is less secure than physically carrying cards inside their wallets. Continue reading
A common security practice used to deal with a password breach is locking user accounts and sending out an email to tell users that they need to reset their password to unlock their account. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of this security practice based on the password reset email that LinkedIn sent out around May 2016, and through an online survey conducted on 249 LinkedIn users who received that email. Our evaluation shows that only about 46% of the participants reset their passwords.
The orthodox paradigm to defend against automated social-engineering attacks in large-scale socio-technical systems is reactive and victim-agnostic. Defenses generally focus on identifying the attacks/attackers (e.g., phishing emails, social-bot infiltrations, malware offered for download). To change the status quo, we propose in our paper presented at NSPW ’16 to identify, even if imperfectly, the vulnerable user population, that is, the users that are likely to fall victim to such attacks. Once identified, information about the vulnerable population can be used in two ways. Continue reading
SOUPS ’16 paper on the prevalence of snooping on mobile phones has received Distinguished Paper award. The paper reports a series of quantitative studies that allowed a more accurate measurement of this phenomena. The study was led by our collaborators at the University of Lisbon. It was inspired by our previous study presented at Mobile CHI ’13. Continue reading